Background: Earnings management has been a popular topic of discussion for many decades, and researchers always look for underlying factors that can reduce the phenomenon. A common subject for this has been board independence, and the implications that independent directors have on earnings management. Additionally, researchers have argued that legal protection is a big part in how independent directors can exercise their monitoring, as well as the use of control-enhancing mechanisms (CEM).

Purpose: To investigate the relationship between board independence and earnings management. This thesis will also examine if shareholder protection and CEMs respectively affect independent directors´ ability to reduce earnings management.

Method: This thesis adopts a positivistic view with a deductive approach using a quantitative method where data was collected using databases, websites, and annual reports. Further, the data was analyzed using a Spearman correlation matrix and an OLS regression for each hypothesis.

Findings: The findings show that there exists no relationship between board independence and earnings management. Furthermore, the thesis does not find support that shareholder protection has a moderating influence on the relationship, and thus has no effect on independent directors’ability to reduce earnings management. However, the thesis finds indications that firms who have the CEM of dual-class shares experience increase in earnings management as the share of independent directors increases.